SHOULD JURIES HEAR COMPLEX PATENT
CASES?
JENNIFER F. MILLER1

ABSTRACT
A debate has arisen within the legal community over the
existence and constitutionality of a so-called “complexity
exception” to the Seventh Amendment. This exception would give a
judge the discretion to deny a jury trial in a civil case if he or she
feels that the issue is too complex for a jury to decide properly.
This iBrief discusses the constitutionality of the complexity
exception and the arguments for and against its implementation,
with particular emphasis on the application of the exception to
patent infringement cases. The iBrief then postulates that, while a
blanket exception for patent infringement cases may not be the
solution, at a minimum some restructuring of the adjudication
process needs to occur in order to ensure that judicial holdings are
more than a mere roll of the dice.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
With the rise in both the complexity and the importance of patent
infringement cases, as well as the need for consistency in the field of patent
law, many legal scholars and practitioners have begun to speculate as to
whether juries are competent to hear patent infringement cases. Some
commentators argue that a “complexity exception” to the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial should be invoked, which would give
judges discretion to withhold cases from a jury where the complexity of the
facts or the underlying legal issues make it impossible for a jury to render a
fair and rational verdict. The constitutional support for the “complexity
exception” is grounded in Seventh Amendment jurisprudence and on the
Fifth Amendment right of due process. This iBrief discusses the
constitutionality of the “complexity exception,” as well as the advantages
and disadvantages of invoking such an exception. It then concludes that,
while a blanket exception for patent infringement cases may not be the
solution, some restructuring of the adjudication process needs to occur in
order to ensure that the judicial holdings are not random or baseless.
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I. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. Historical Background
¶2

The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.2

When adopted in 1789, the Constitution did not include the right to a trial
by jury in civil cases. The founders considered and rejected the idea of
including the right based on the argument that the states’ civil trial practices
differed so markedly that such a provision would be impossible to draft.3
However, during ratification of the Constitution, many states objected to the
absence of an explicit right to civil jury trials.4 This objection ultimately led
the first Congress to include the Seventh Amendment in the Bill of Rights.5
The task of defining the scope of the Amendment has been arduous,
particularly since little guidance can be gleaned from the circumstances
surrounding its adoption. No record of the congressional debates
surrounding the Amendment’s adoption exists,6 and the debate over the
original constitutional provision that was ultimately abandoned is
“unilluminating.”7
¶3

¶4
However, the language of the Amendment itself provides some
guidance as to its scope. First, as defined, the right applies only to “Suits at
common law.” Second, the right to a jury is “preserved,” as opposed to
“guaranteed.” The framers arguably chose such vague terms in drafting the

2

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

3

Delegates Pinckney and Gerry formally moved to have the following
language added to the Constitution: ‘And a trial by jury shall be preserved
as usual in civil cases.’ . . . Delegates Gorham and King, however,
objected, stating that different states constituted their juries differently and
used them in different types of actions; the proposed amendment was
subsequently rejected.
2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 628-29 (quoted in
Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to a
Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 585 n. 16 (1984)).
4
King, supra note 3, at 585.
5
Id.
6
Deborah M. Altman, Defining the Role of the Jury in Patent Litigation: The
Court Takes Inventory, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 699, 704 (1997).
7
King, supra note 3, at 585.

2004

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 4

Amendment because of “the fluid state of the right to a jury trial at the
time.”8 In addition, the use of the term “preserve” indicates that the drafters
intended, not to create a new right, but to recognize an existing one.9 This
then begs the question: What is the scope of the right being preserved?

B. Historical Test
Justice Story answered this question in United States v. Wonson,10
when he wrote that the right preserved by the Seventh Amendment is the
right that existed at English common law and not the “common law of any
individual state.”11 History, therefore, attributes Justice Story with devising
the “historical test” for applying the Seventh Amendment. Under the
“historical test,” a “jury trial . . . [is granted] if one would have been granted
under similar conditions by English common law”12; the test applies the
English common law of 1791, the year the Seventh Amendment was
adopted.13
¶5

¶6
However, the question arose as to how courts should apply the test
to causes of action unknown to 1791 common law. In Parsons v. Bedford,14
another case heard by Justice Story, the United States Supreme Court held
that the right to a jury was not limited to “suits, which the common law
recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [rather the right
extends to] suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and
determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were
recognized, and equitable remedies were administered.”15 Therefore, the
right to a jury trial was not confined solely to causes of action available at
English common law.16 Rather, as the Supreme Court held in 1987, courts
are to look at whether or not the cause of action is analogous to an English
common law case for which a jury was afforded.17 In Tull v. United States,
8

Joseph A. Miron, Jr., Note, The Constitutionality of a Complexity Exception to
the Seventh Amendment, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 869 (1998).
9
Id.
10
29 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
11
Id. at 750 (“Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the
common law of any individual state (for it probably differs in all), but it is the
common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.”).
12
Miron, supra note 8, at 870-71 (referring to the test as the “mechanistic
approach” and restating the rule as “if the right a civil jury trial existed at
common law, it must exist under the Seventh Amendment”).
13
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898), overruled by Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
14
28 U.S. 433 (1830).
15
Id. at 447.
16
Altman, supra note 6, at 704 (citing Parson, 28 U.S at 446-47).
17
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987); see also Chauffers, Teamsters
& Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565-66 (1990) (holding that
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the Court, in explaining the test, held that while the Seventh Amendment
requires “a jury trial on the merits in those actions that are analogous to
‘Suits at common law[,]’ . . . actions that are analogous to 18th-century
cases tried in courts of equity or admiralty, do not require a jury trial.”18
The Court went on to hold that the analysis applies to both common law
forms of action and those created by Congress.19 Under the “historical
test,” therefore, a judge will afford a jury trial in cases where the cause of
action more closely resembles an eighteenth-century legal cause of action,
than a cause of action in equity, and where the remedy sought is legal in
nature, as opposed to equitable.20
The situation became even more difficult when Congress adopted
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, which merged the courts of
law and equity.21 Under these rules, modern cases reached a level of
complexity far surpassing that of English common law cases of 1791
making it increasingly difficult to compare modern cases to that of
eighteenth-century England.22 This increase in complexity was due
primarily to the “liberalization of civil procedure” and the “unprecedented
proliferation of new causes of action” that resulted from the new procedural
rules.23
¶7

It is argued that one result of the increased difficulty of comparison
is that courts are beginning to slightly alter the “historical test.”24 In so
doing, these courts recognize that it is more logical and appropriate to apply
the rationale that underlies the distinction between cases held in courts of
law and courts of equity than to merely refer to a predetermined list of
causes of action.25
¶8

¶9
Therefore, one must ask: Does the complexity of today’s cases so
surpass that of English common law cases of 1791 that the “historical test”
should no longer apply? Were complex cases even heard by the courts of
law in 1791?

the right to a jury trial exists in causes of action unknown at common law that
are analogous to eighteenth century forms of action).
18
Tull, 481 U.S. at 417.
19
Id.
20
Miron, supra note 8, at 873.
21
See FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
22
Miron, supra note 8, at 872.
23
King, supra note 3, at 581.
24
Miron, supra note 8, at 873 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)); see also id. at 887 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S.
531, 538 (1970) (stating that the “practical abilities and limitations of juries”
should be considered in the decision to grant a jury trial)).
25
Id. at 873.
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II. COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION
¶10
Many legal scholars have proposed a “complexity exception” to the
Seventh Amendment that would result in a denial of a jury trial when the
jury is unable to perform its task properly because of either the length of the
trial or the complexity of the facts or underlying legal issues. Some argue
that this exception existed in English common law and thus satisfies the
“historical test.”26 Others argue that, while an exception did not exist at
English common law, the “historical test” is nonetheless satisfied because
the court of law did not in fact hear complex cases even absent an explicit
exception.27 A final argument for validating the exception is based on the
Fifth Amendment right of due process.28

A. Is There a Basis for the Exception in English Common Law?
1. Complexity exception found in English common law
¶11
In a paper published in 1998, Joseph Miron argued that a
“complexity exception” was recognized by the 1791 common law.29 The
English legal system at the time had two courts: the Court of Chancery
(Court of Equity) and the Courts of Common Law. Miron alleged that the
Chancellor, who decided both the legal and factual issues of cases in the
Court of Equity, was permitted to take cases out of the Courts of Common
Law, where they would be heard by juries, when the Chancellor “concluded
that the case involved issues beyond the understanding of the jury.”30
Accordingly, Miron concluded that “the principle of removing complex
cases from a jury was accepted in English common law, and therefore
should be part of the Seventh Amendment today.”31
¶12
In support of his conclusion, Miron pointed to several otherwise
legal causes of action involving extensive materials and complex legal
issues that were heard by the Chancellor.32 For example, in 1603 the
Chancellor decided Clench v. Tomley,33 a case involving personal property.
In asserting jurisdiction over the case, the Chancellor stated that the
documents, which amounted to the bulk of the case, were too complex for
an average juror to read and comprehend.34 One court, however, argued
26

See id. at 873-80.
See King, supra note 3, at 584.
28
See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084-86 (3d
Cir. 1980).
29
See generally Miron, supra note 8, at 873-80.
30
Id. at 874.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 876-77, 880.
33
21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603).
34
Miron, supra note 8, at 877 (citing Clench, 21 Eng. Rep. at 13).
27
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that the report of this decision is likely “inaccurate or incomplete,” or, in the
alternative, that it is “an aberration, without precedent and subsequently
disregarded.”35
A second case of relevance, though admittedly decided after 1791,
is the Court of Chancery’s decision in Wedderburn v. Pickering.36 The
plaintiff in Wedderburn was granted judicial review of a cause of action
over the ownership of land.37 In granting judicial review, the court held that
the case could be “more conveniently tried without a jury,” in view of the
fact that it involved extensive written materials.38 The Chancellor initially
expressed his usual unwillingness to interfere with a defendant’s right to a
jury trial, but he admitted an exception “when there is some reason why the
case cannot be conveniently tried before a jury.”39
¶13

¶14
By stating that a defendant’s common law right to a jury could be
taken away in select circumstances, the Chancellor was arguably admitting
the existence of a complexity exception. Quoting Clark v. Cookson,40 the
Chancellor explained those situations in which the inconvenience of a jury
could result in the Chancellor invoking this exception, stating that the rule
giving a judge discretion to order the case heard by a judge, rather than a
jury, “was flamed expressly to meet cases which would, under the old
system, have been tried in the Chancery Division, and which might be
considered, by reason of involving a mixture of law and fact, or from great
complexity, or otherwise, not capable of being conveniently tried before a
jury.”41 Miron concluded, therefore, that the Chancellor clearly felt that the
Court of Chancery should, and always did, have jurisdiction over complex
cases.42
¶15
However, at least one court has refuted such a reading of
Wedderburn. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in In re
Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation43 that Clark and
Wedderburn should be read to imply exactly the opposite of what Miron
argued.44 The court argued that these cases do not indicate that a

35

In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1082-83 (3d Cir.
1980).
36
13 Ch. D. 769 (1879).
37
Id. at 769.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 771.
40
2 Ch. D. 746 (1876).
41
Wedderburn, 13 Ch. D. at 771 (emphasis added).
42
Miron, supra note 8, at 878.
43
631 F.2d 1069 (1980).
44
Id. at 1081. However, as discussed infra, the Third Circuit ultimately
accepted a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment grounded on a due
process argument. Id. at 1086.
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complexity exception existed; rather they indicate that complexity alone
was never sufficient grounds for relief in equity.45 As the court explained,
Clark and Wedderburn were decided after the passage of the Court of
Judicature Acts46 in 1875, which merged the English courts of law and
equity.47 Under the Act, jury trials were available upon request.48
However, the court could deny a jury trial for an issue that, prior to the
Acts, would have been heard by a court of equity.49 The Chancellor in
Clark was defining this exception and, according to the Third Circuit, in so
doing, “identifie[d] two separate prerequisites to a denial of a jury trial
demand: trial of the matter in the court of chancery prior to the merger and
complexity or other grounds for believing that a jury would be
unsuitable.”50 According to the Third Circuit, the Chancellor’s use of the
conjunction “and” implies that “complexity alone was not a ground for
relief in equity.”51 In Wedderburn, both prerequisites were satisfied since
the plaintiff sought an injunction, i.e., equitable relief.52
2. Procedural limitations create the same effect as a complexity exception
¶16
In a paper published in 1984, Douglas King argued that, even
lacking an explicit complexity exception in English common law, “the
procedural limits within which the jury functioned insured that no complex
cases would ever reach the jury.”53 King based his argument on the fact that
the limiting effects of the writ system, the strict rules of pleading, and the
law of evidence severely narrowed the scope of common law cases heard by
juries.54
Under the writ system, a separate writ was required for each of the
“narrowly and precisely” defined forms of action brought before the court.55
According to King, the effect of this system was to “severely limit[] the
subject matter of any single lawsuit.”56 It did so by “limit[ing] the questions
in any particular case to a few related issues of fact or law raised by a
¶17

45

Id.
36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66 (1873), 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 77 (1875) (cited in In re
Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1081).
47
In re Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1081.
48
Order XXXVI, Rules 2, 3 (cited in In re Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1081).
49
Id. Rule 26 (cited in In re Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1081).
50
In re Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1081 (emphasis added).
51
Id.
52
See id. See Miron, supra note 8, at 878-89 (discusses cases that demonstrate
that the Court of Chancery invoked the complexity exception).
53
King, supra note 3, at 584.
54
Id. at 586-89.
55
Id. at 587 (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *153-66).
56
Id.
46
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narrowly defined form of action.”57 King argued that “this limitation made
it unlikely that a case presented to a jury would involve more than a single
transaction among a small number of parties.”58
King also argued that the rules of pleadings and the law of evidence
each contributed to the narrowing scope of the cases and ultimately
“restricted the complexity of the cases that could be put before a jury.”59
Under the strict rules of pleadings, every plea was required to be “simple,”
“connected,” and “confined to one single point.” 60 In addition, parties were
not permitted to enter pleas that would require a variety of different answers
or involve numerous issues.61 Thus, the argument continued, this strict
system of pleadings was implemented for the purpose of preventing juries
from being overtaxed by complex issues.62 This strict system combined
with the required writ system ensured that cases were short and simple, with
the ordinary case lasting no longer than a day.63
¶18

3. Colonial support
¶19
Modern commentators are arguably not alone in their belief that
some version of a complexity exception existed in English common law. In
the Federalist No. 83,64 Alexander Hamilton indicated that he believed that
the English common law of 1791 withheld complex cases from juries.65
¶20

Hamilton stated:
My conventions are equally strong that great advantages result from
the separation of the equity from the law jurisdiction, and that the
causes which belong to the former would be improperly committed to
juries. The great and primary use of a court of equity is to give relief
in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules. . . .
[T]he circumstances that constitute cases proper for courts of equity
are in many instances so nice and intricate, that they are incompatible
with the genius of trials by jury. They require such long, deliberate,
and critical investigation as would be impracticable to men called from

57

Id. at 588.
Id.
59
Id.
60
3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at 311 (cited in King, supra note 3, at 588).
61
Id.
62
King, supra note 3, at 588.
63
Id. at 589 (citing Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English
Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 58
(1980)).
64
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 83 (McLean’s ed.), available at
http://www.civnet.org/resources/document/historic/fedpaper/fed83.htm (last
visited Mar. 24, 2004).
65
Miron, supra note 8, at 881.
58
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their occupations, and obliged to decide before they were permitted to
return to them. The simplicity and expedition which form the
distinguishing characters of this mode of trial require that the matter
be decided should be reduced to some single and obvious point; while
the litigations usual in chancery frequently comprehend a long train of
minute and independent particulars.66
¶21
Arguably, Hamilton believed that “intricate” cases requiring “long,
deliberate, and critical investigation,” in other words, complex cases, were
“incompatible with the genius of trials by jury,” and instead were “cases
proper for courts of equity,” or judges. He felt that only cases involving
some “single and obvious point” should be heard by the courts of common
law, and, therefore, juries. If this interpretation of Hamilton’s statements is
accepted, it arguably represents the early American jurists’ interpretation of
“Suits at common law,” which should dictate the scope of the Seventh
Amendment today, making it of particular relevance to the complexity
exception debate.

B. Even Lacking a Basis in English Common Law, is it Otherwise
Constitutional?
¶22
A completely separate argument for a complexity exception is
premised on the Fifth Amendment right of due process. This argument was
in fact accepted by the Third Circuit in In re Japanese when the court held
that, when attempting to accommodate both the Fifth and Seventh
Amendment, the appropriate action for a court to take is to deny the right to
a jury where, due to an inability to understand the evidence and the relevant
legal standards, a jury will be unable to perform its task of rational
decisionmaking.67
¶23
Due process requires that a jury “resolve each disputed issue on the
basis of a fair and reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and
reasonable application of the relevant legal rules.”68 This requirement
presumes that a jury is able to comprehend the evidence and the relevant
legal rules.69 If it cannot, there is “no reliable safeguard against erroneous
decisions,” the “primary value promoted by due process in factfinding
procedures.”70 The Third Circuit, therefore, found that a conflict exists
between the Fifth and Seventh Amendments when a lawsuit is so complex
that it renders a jury unable to decide the issues in a rational manner, and

66

Hamilton, supra note 64 (emphasis added).
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir.
1980).
68
Id. at 1084.
69
Id.
70
Id.
67
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decided the conflict in favor of the Fifth Amendment.71 Specifically, the
court held that “the due process objections to jury trial of a complex case
implicate values of fundamental importance,” while the denial of a jury trial
does not, and further that in complex cases, “the interests protected by this
procedural rule of due process carry greater weight than the interests served
by the constitutional guarantee of jury trial.”72 The Third Circuit, therefore,
upheld a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment grounded on a
Fifth Amendment due process argument.

C. Is There Supreme Court Support for a Complexity Exception?
1. The famous footnote 10
¶24
The Supreme Court fueled the debate over the existence of a
complexity exception in its famous footnote 10 of Ross v. Bernhard.73 The
issue in Ross was whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial in
shareholder derivative actions.74 The Court ultimately held that, with
respect to those issues in a shareholder derivative action to which a right to
a jury would attach had the corporation been suing in its own right, the right
is afforded to the corporation’s shareholders.75 More important than the
holding, however, was the Court’s discussion of what causes of action
would be entitled to a jury. In this discussion, the Court cited Parsons v.
Bedford76 to introduce the proposition that the Seventh Amendment
preserved the right to a jury in suits involving legal rights and remedies, and
not those involving equitable rights and remedies.77 It further stated that the
“Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried
rather than the character of the overall action.”78 In clarifying how the
nature of the issue can be determined the court then added, in a footnote:
“[a]s our cases indicate, the ‘legal’ nature of an issue is determined by
considering first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions;
second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations
of juries.”79
¶25
The Third Circuit has cited footnote 10 for the proposition that the
Supreme Court has at least “left open the possibility” that the range of suits
subject to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury may be limited by the

71

Id. at 1084, 1086.
Id. at 1084.
73
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
74
Id. at 531.
75
Id. at 532-33.
76
28 U.S. 433 (1830).
77
Ross, 396 U.S. at 533.
78
Id. at 538.
79
Id. at 538 n. 10 (emphasis added).
72
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“practical abilities and limitation of juries” and that the Court does not feel
that its prior Seventh Amendment cases preclude such a ruling.80 In
addition, at the other end of the spectrum, the footnote is credited with
“originating the complexity exception” altogether.81 However, some are
leery of giving significant weight to the Court’s statement, since it was
made in a footnote. The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the constitutionality of
the “complexity exception,” held that it was “doubtful that the Supreme
Court would attempt to make such a radical departure from its prior
interpretation of a constitutional provision in a footnote.”82 The Third
Circuit, on the other hand, while also finding it unlikely that the Court
would make such an “important new application of the [S]eventh
[A]mendment [sic] in such a cursory fashion,” held that:
The third prong of the test plainly recognizes the significance, for
purposes of the [S]eventh [A]mendment [sic], of the possibility that a
suit may be too complex for a jury. Its inclusion in the three prong test
strongly suggests that jury trial might not be guaranteed in
extraordinarily complex cases, even though the Parsons v. Bedford
line of Supreme Court cases, reflected in the first two prongs, would
read the [S]eventh [A]mendment [sic] as applying to the suits.83
¶26
Some argue that the Supreme Court reigned in any speculation
surrounding Ross in 1987 when it decided Tull v. United States.84 In Tull,
the Court began its opinion by explaining that the process for determining
whether a constitutional right to a jury trial exists required looking to both
the nature of the cause of action and the remedy sought.85 In a footnote, the
Court stated that it “has also considered practical limitations of a jury trial
and its functional compatibility with proceedings outside the traditional
courts of law in holding that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to
administrative proceedings,” but that “the Court has not used these
considerations as an independent basis for extending the right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment.”86 This footnote has been interpreted by
some as an indication that the “practical abilities and limitations of juries”
should only be a factor in determining whether the Seventh Amendment
applies to administrative law courts and not as a factor in determining

80

In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1080 (3d Cir.
1980).
81
Miron, supra note 8, at 886.
82
In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 425 (9th Cir. 1979).
83
In re Japanese, 631 F.2d at 1079-80.
84
481 U.S. 412 (1987).
85
Id. at 417-18.
86
Id. at 418 n. 4 (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 454 (1997); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S.
363, 383 (1974)).
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whether the Seventh Amendment applies to civil cases generally, and thus
as a repudiation of the complexity exception.87
2. Functional considerations
¶27
The Supreme Court may have again given credence to the
complexity exception, however, in Markman v. Westview Industries, Inc.88
when Justice Souter listed “functional considerations” as a factor that
district courts hearing patent cases should consider in deciding whether to
grant a jury trial.89 In Markman, the Court held that “[w]here history and
precedent provide no clear answers, functional considerations also play their
part in the choice between judge and jury.”90 The Court went on to cite
Miller v. Fenton91 for the proposition that “when an issue ‘falls somewhere
between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law
distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the
sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned to
decide the issue in question.’”92 The Court then held that, in the case at
issue, judges were better capable of determining the acquired meaning of
patent terms.93 The Court’s conclusion was based on the reasoning that
judges, who are “unburdened by training in exegesis,” construct written
instruments more frequently and better than jurors.94 The Court went on
further to state:
Patent construction in particular ‘is a special occupation, requiring,
like all others, special training and practice. The judge, from his
training and discipline, is more likely to give proper interpretation to
such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be
right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.’95

By basing its decision, at least in part, on what judges are likely to do better
than juries, the Supreme Court arguably admitted that there is an exception
to the general right of jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment
where judges “are more likely to be right” than juries.96
87

Altman, supra note 6, at 706.
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
89
Miron, supra note 8, at 887 (citing Markman, 517 U.S. at 388).
90
Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
91
474 U.S. 104 (1985).
92
Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (citing Miller, 474 U.S. at 114).
93
Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 388-89 (citing Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1849) (No. 10,740)).
96
See Miron, supra note 8 at 887, 891 (Miron argued that by relying on
“functional considerations,” which bear no relationship to the nature of the cause
of action or the remedy sought, the Court is evidencing its support for the
88
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Assuming that a “complexity exception” is constitutional, either
because it was recognized in the English common law or because it is
necessary to satisfy the Fifth Amendment, and assuming that the Supreme
Court has not foreclosed such an exception, the question remains: Is an
exception necessary or even beneficial with respect to patent infringement
cases?
¶28

III. COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION AS APPLIED TO PATENT
INFRINGEMENT CASES
¶29
Patent litigation involves some of the most complex legal theories
and underlying factual issues of any type of litigation today. The actors
involved in patent infringement cases are highly specialized in their
respective scientific fields. For example, most patent attorneys received
some form of technical training prior to pursuing a career as an attorney. It
is clearly debatable whether an average individual would be able to acquire
enough knowledge concerning the legal nuances of patent law and the
underlying technology specific to the case within the confines of a trial to
render a verdict that is based solely on the facts and legal issues of that case.

Some argue that “[p]atent litigation is inherently complex.”97 This
argument is based primarily on the “arcane” rules for drafting claims and
examining patents and the heightened complexity of the scientific principles
underlying patents today.98 For example, in a patent claim the terms
“comprising,” “consisting of,” and “consisting essentially of” have
drastically different consequences on the scope of the patent.99 These
principles, arguably, were “not anticipated by early patent law
jurisprudence.”100
¶30

¶31
Commentators on the other side of the argument contend that “it is
not the case that all patent cases, by their very nature, are too complex for a
jury.”101 These commentators further argue that even when a case is in fact
overwhelmingly complex, there is still no compelling reason to remove the
case from the jury’s consideration at least in part because “[j]udges are no
more knowledgeable than the average citizen with regard to complex

existence of a “complexity exception,” and is going beyond the “historical test”
to consider “other facets of the English common law that had been ignored.”).
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Altman, supra note 6, at 699.
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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
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scientific subject matter.”102 In addition, others argue that “while the
evidence may be complex, the counsel’s task, as an officer of the court, is to
make it understandable to the average juror.”103
However, a
counterargument to this second point is that this rationale for denying the
complexity exception “misses the point of why a complexity exception
exists,” since “presenting the issues [in a complex case] in an
‘understandable’ way may involve glossing over many of the intricacies and
result in an inaccurate picture of the facts.”104
¶32
One byproduct of speculation that juries are unable to comprehend
the subject matter of patent infringement cases is the concern that the
decisions they render are arbitrary, unpredictable, and based on
considerations other than the relevant law. It is argued that “[j]ury verdicts
in patent cases are . . . often unpredictable and inconsistent,” and because
patents are becoming increasingly important in our economy, both
nationally and globally, there is a “pressing need for uniformity in the
application of patent law.”105 It is questionable whether a jury can provide
such uniformity when it bases its decision on only a rudimentary
understanding of the law and the inventions at issue.

1. Practical implications
¶33
When asked to comment on the practical implications of a
complexity exception with respect to patent infringement cases, Patrick
Elsevier, patent litigator, stated that, while the complexity exception is a
“good start[,] . . . it does not go far enough.”106 As an additional step, he
suggested having “dedicated patent trial courts.”107

In my opinion, it would be wise to have specialized trial courts
dedicated to hearing patent cases. Just as there was a need for the
102

Id.
Miron, supra note 8, at 884 (citing generally Morris S. Arnold, A Historical
Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 829, 830 (1980); Maxwell M. Blecher & Candace E. Carlo, Toward More
Effective Handling of Complex Antitrust Cases, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 727, 744;
Maxwell M. Blecher & Howard F. Daniels, In Defense of Juries in Complex
Antitrust Litigation, 1 REV. LITIG. 47, 48 (1980); James L. Flannery, Note,
Complex Civil Litigation: Reconciling the Demands of Due Process with the
Rights to Trial by Jury, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 694 (1981); Lisa S. Meyer,
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Federal Circuit to hear appeals from patent cases in order to create
more uniformity in the law, likewise, it makes sense to have dedicated
patent trial courts to address inconsistency at the trial court level.108

Elsevier further suggested that the complexity exception is
inadequate. He stated that “[a]lthough there are trial judges who have a
technical background and/or an affinity for patent cases, there are many
judges who have no technical background and have had little, if any,
exposure to patent law whatsoever.”109 The complexity exception,
therefore, is inadequate, in his opinion, because if one of the latter judges
were assigned a complex patent case, “there is little reason to believe that
such a judge would decide the case much better than a competent jury.”110
He states that the “Federal Circuit’s high rate of reversal in patent cases,
whether decided by judge or jury, bears this out.”111
¶34

¶35
This high rate of reversal by the Federal Circuit is also evidence
that “Markman has made the initial trial little more than a trial run.”112 This
is seen by Elsevier as yet another reason to create specialized patent trial
courts. He argued:

It does not seem to be good use of judicial (and the parties’) resources
to have a trial judge go through the effort of interpreting the claims if
the Federal Circuit is going to give little deference to that judge’s
decision. It also makes it more likely that the loser at trial will appeal
if it knows that there is a good chance that the decision at trial will be
overturned. If there was a specialized trial court that construed claims
correctly the majority of the time, it is more likely that parties, having
a good understanding of their case, would settle after the Markman
hearing without going through the expense of a trial or, that if the case
did go to trial, that the losing party would forgo the expense of an
appeal.113
¶36
Randal Ayers, also a patent litigator, stated that he too would favor
judges over juries in patent cases if we were “writing on a clean slate.”114
He has seen first hand that some patent cases are “extremely complex and
simply too much for a jury to handle.”115 While admitting that he has seen
numerous judges struggle to apply patent law principles, he felt that they
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“clearly do a better job than juries and are better at wading through the
smokescreen put up by the lawyers and experts.”116
¶37
However, Ayers recognized that we are not in fact writing on a
clean slate.117 In fact, he finds unconvincing the arguments that a
complexity exception was in existence in the 1791 common law.118 He
argued instead that the commentators have selected “a predetermined
result” and attempted to justify that result with a “selective reading of
history.”119 Ayers feared that “[i]f citations to a few outlying cases justifies
reversing centuries of decisions deciding the exact opposite we would not
have any laws.”120
¶38
In general, Ayers argued that implementing a complexity exception
to the Seventh Amendment for patent infringement cases was not necessary
despite the advantage of a reduction in the cost of patent litigation.121 He
warned that it would be both difficult and inconsistently applied.122

2. Need for restructuring of adjudication process
¶39
From a practical perspective, suppose that you are IBM and you
have spent countless man-hours and millions of dollars developing and
promoting your “MEMS RF switch with low actuation voltage.”123 How
comfortable would you feel allowing a jury of average individuals to decide
the fate of your product where the claims of your patent look like this:

1. A MEMS (micro-electromechanical) RF switch apparatus operable
under low actuation voltage, the apparatus comprising:
a substrate;
a first electrode attached to the substrate;
116
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Ayers stated that:
[P]atent cases are phenomenally expensive, and in many cases a relatively
fast ruling on a dispositive defense could quickly resolve the case (if the
defendant wins) or facilitate settlement. If judges know they will have to
decide the case anyway they will look for ways to focus discovery on the
best defenses early and then move quickly to summary judgment motions.
This could reduce the costs of patent cases tremendously.
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a first layer of dielectric material having a dielectric constant above 10
on the first electrode;
a second electrode positioned above the first electrode creating a first
space having a height less than 5000 Angstroms between the first layer
of dielectric and the second electrode; and
a support element for suspending the second electrode when the switch
is in an open position and for moving the second electrode when the
second electrode is pulled to the layer of dielectric material when the
switch is in a closed position in response to a voltage between the first
and second electrodes.124
¶40
Now imagine that you are a juror, and you are asked to determine
the validity of Glaxo Wellcome S.A.’s, patent for antifungal sordaricin
derivatives125 with the following general desciption:

A compound of general formula (I) and physiologically acceptable
salts wherein R represents phthalidyl, (2-oxo-5-methyl-1,3-diox-olen4-yl)methyl or the group CHR.sub.4 OCO(O)pR.sub.5 wherein
R.sub.4 is hydrogen or C.sub.1-4 alcyl, p is zero or I, R.sub.5 is
C.sub.1-6 alkly, C.sub.5-8 cycloalyl (optionally substituted by
C.sub.1-3 alkyl or carboxyl), C.sub.1-4 alkyl substituted by C.sub.1-3
alkoxy or carboxy), C.sub.1-4 alkyl substituted by one or more groups
selected from amino, (C.sub.1-4 alkylamino di(C.sub.1-4 alkyl)amino
or carboxyl, phenyl (optionally substituted by carboxyl or aminoalkyl,
C.sub.1-4 alkylaminoalkyl or di(C.sub.1-4 alkyl)aminoalcyl, or
R.sub.5 is a 5-8 membered heterocyclic group containing 1 or 2
heteroatoms selected from oxygen or nitrogen, processes for their
preparation, pharmaceutical compositions containing them and their
use in medicine.126

How comfortable would you be with the responsibility of determining
whether this patent is valid? If at the end of closing statements you are still
unsure of the meaning of certain technical terms or do not fully understand
the legal issues, but you have been out of work for two weeks, will you be
tempted to render a verdict based on your feelings about the parties or their
attorneys rather than strictly on the facts of the case?
¶41
Jurors in patent cases are put in a unique position given the highly
complex nature of the subject matter they are asked to consider. There is no
doubt that some will be able to readily understand the relevant laws and the
underlying technology, but many will struggle. There is also no doubt that
some cases come down to nothing more than a battle of “he said, she said”
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requiring no technical expertise whatsoever. However, patents have
become too important and trials have become too expensive for their
outcomes to be left to such uncertain destinies. Merely invoking a blanket
exception for all patent cases may nonetheless be inappropriate, since
judges with no background in either the technology or patent law generally
will arguably be no better suited than jurors to try a complex patent
infringement case, and, as stated above, the exception may not be necessary
in all cases.
¶42
The government’s decision to direct all patent appeals cases to a
single court of appeals was definitely a step towards creating uniformity in
patent verdicts. In view of the fact that the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is now well versed in patent law and has been given vast exposure to
various fields of technology, it is arguably well-equipped to render rational
and consistent verdicts. However, this hardly seems sufficient. Trials are
expensive and time consuming. Why wait until the appellate level to have
triers of fact that are prepared to render accurate and consistent verdicts?
While no one solution seems without flaw, it is undeniable that some
restructuring of the adjudication system needs to occur in order to prevent
patent infringement cases from being left to mere chance.

CONCLUSION
¶43
The Seventh Amendment guarantees a trial by jury for “Suits at
common law.” The scope of this guarantee has traditionally been
interpreted based on the scope of the right at English common law in 1791.
It has been argued, therefore, that because the Courts of Common Law
(which utilized juries) under certain circumstances did not hear complex
cases, either because the Chancellor invoked his right to remove those cases
to the Court of Chancery or because the cases heard involved no more than
a single issue of fact or law, the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a
jury trial in complex cases. It has also been argued that even if the Seventh
Amendment guarantees a jury trial in all cases analogous to English
common law cases, simple or complex, the Fifth Amendment right of due
process trumps this Seventh Amendment guarantee where a jury would be
unable to perform its job because of a failure to grasp the legal issues or the
underlying facts of a case.
¶44
Assuming a complexity exception is constitutional, and even
supported by the Supreme Court, the debate continues as to whether or not
invoking the exception is necessary in patent infringement cases. The legal
issues behind patent drafting claims, the validity of patents, and patent
infringement are difficult for even the average individual to understand
given time and an opportunity to study. It is questionable whether a jury
could understand these complex legal issues sufficiently given the limited
amount of instruction and time they are given within the confines of a trial.
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In addition, patent cases certainly involve subject matter that was never
conceived of in 1791. Therefore, we must ask: Does it make sense to
compare patent infringement cases to cases heard by the English Courts of
Common Law in 1791? It is also debatable whether a judge with no
scientific background or experience with patent law will be able to decide a
case any better than a jury. Presumably, a judge will have a better base
from which to understand the legal issues, but the technical and scientific
facts may be completely foreign to him or her. In either case, it seems
apparent that some restructuring needs to occur in order to increase the
uniformity in patent infringement cases and to prevent their holdings from
being no more than a roll of the dice.

